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P.: Constitutional Law--Courts-Martial--Jurisdiction Over Ex-Servicem
CASE COMMENTS

sufficient for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952). This rule stands
without exception. However, stronger allegations might, in a proper
case, bring § 2255 into play. Thus, Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14 (D.
C. Cir. 1945), allowed a hearing under § 2255. There numerous
obvious errors had been committed by the defendant's counsel, e.g.,
he had failed to object to admission in evidence of an involuntary
confession, to call witnesses who would have established the defendant's innocence, to offer a relevant defense and to take steps to
obtain an examination of handwritings in a forgery case. See Adams
v. United States, 222 F.2d 45 (D. C. Cir. 1955) where the defendant's criticism of his attorney was made at the time of sentencing
in the presence of the court, but the petition was denied, since
the trial court had had an opportunity to decide the issue at that
time.

The courts lay down two general reasons for this strict standard.
One is that they do not want to open a 'Pandora's box of accusations" for every person convicted of a crime and sentenced. United
States v. Malfetti, 125 F. Supp. 27, 80 (D.N.J. 1954). "If the test
to be applied depended upon the skill with which a defendant was
represented, there would never be any finality to a trial." Miller v.
Hudspeth, 176 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1949). The other and closely
related reason, is that the courts do not think they should use "hindsight", or "second guessing", in determining if trial strategy had
been good or bad. Hillman v. State, supra at 188, dissenting opinion.
In the principal case the court indicated that the defendant's
allegations of trickery should have been asserted in the trial court
and by appeal. But it would seem that the defendant would not
be able to present a case reversible under due process, whether on
appeal or by habeas corpus, or under § 2255, since the substantive
test for denial of due process does not appear to have been met.
The defendant still would be denied the relief he sought. It is little
consolation to the defendant to advise him that his mistake was
only procedural, when it was substantive as well.
G. T. L.
CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW - Cours-MA TIAL - JUIusDICTION OVER

'Ex-SERvIcE m_. - Five months after being honorably discharged
from the Air Force, a former serviceman was arrested by military
authorities on a charge of murder committed while serving as an
airman in Korea. He was taken to Korea to stand trial under au-
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thority of art. 3(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice which
authorizes courts-martial after separation from the services of former servicemen for certain crimes committed during service and for
which accused cannot be tried in a federal court. Upon petition
for habeas corpus the district court released the prisoner without
passing on the validity of art. 3(a). The court of appeals reversed
the decision of the lower court upholding the constitutionality of
this section of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Held, that Congress has no power to subject
a discharged serviceman to trial by courts-martial for offenses committed while in the service, thus depriving him of the constitutional safeguards protecting persons accused of crime in a federal court. Judgment reversed. Three Justices dissented on the ground that the constitutional provision empowering Congress to regulate the armed
forces when read with the necessary and proper clause in art. I, §
8, cl. 18, was sufficiently broad to sustain this provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. United States v. Quarles, 76 Sup.
Ct. 1 (1955).
The Federal Constitution provides that Congress shall have the
power to raise and support armies and maintain a navy; to make
rules for the government and regulation of these forces, and to
make all laws necessary and proper for carrying these foregoing
powers into execution. U. S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. Upon this section
is based the system of military law known today as the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. 64 STAT. 107 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 551
(1952). Certain sections of this code set forth the framework for
the courts-martial jurisdiction of all of the armed forces. It is one
aspect of this jurisdiction which presents the question set forth in
the principal case. Article 3(a) of the Uniform Code authorizes
courts-martial of former servicemen for certain crimes committed
prior to their discharge provided that the federal courts do not have
jurisdiction. 64 STAT. 109 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 553 (1953). The
Supreme Court, in the instant case, refused to recognize the contention that military jurisdiction could be extended to civilians
who had severed all relationships with the military and declared
art. 3(a) unconstitutional. In order to appreciate the effect of this
ruling it is important to have a general understanding of the facts
and circumstances which led Congress to extend the authority of
military tribunals to this point.
The necessity for some type of legislation to cover the exserviceman for serious crimes committed while in the armed forces
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can best be exemplified by the famous case arising out of the last
war involving the murder of an American army major by two of
his men while serving behind the German lines in Italy. The crime
was not discovered until the persons involved had been returned
to the United States and honorably discharged. Even if their guilt
were unquestionable, these men could not be extradited to Italy
for trial since the treaty between the United States and that country
had been abrogated by the war. In re Lo Doice, 106 F. Supp. 455
(W.D.N.Y. 1952). Since they were not subject to courts-martial
under the military law in effect at that time, and there was no statute
extending the jurisdiction of the federal courts to this situation, these
men were permitted to go unpunished. In view of this and other
serious crimes over which no court had jurisdiction, it was obvious
that some legislation was in order, the only question being whether
to extend the authority of the military or of the federal courts.
Congress chose the former but not without some doubt as to its
validity.
Article ninety-four of the Articles of War, which governed
the army prior to 1950, provided that courts-martial jurisdiction
would extend to those discharged servicemen who committed certain enumerated frauds against the government while in the service.
41 STAT. 804 (1920), 10 U.S.C. § 1599 (1949). A Supreme Court
decision, prior to the passage of the Uniform Code of Military Justice held that jurisdiction over offenses committed while in the
service was terminated on discharge, except for certain cases of
fraud. Hershberg v. Cook, 336 U.S. 210 (1949). Although the
Hershberg case did not decide the validity of art. 94, the constitutionality of this section had been questioned in the lower federal
courts on several occasions. As the dissent pointed out, it was
upheld in one such test. Kronberg v. Hale, 180 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.
1950). However, in a district court case it was declared invalid.
Flanneryv. Commanding General,69 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
Thus when Congress was faced with the question of including a
provision similar to but broader than art. 94, as part of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice there was some uncertainty as to its constitutionality. The principal case provides the answer.
It has been held that the power of Congress in the government
of the land and naval forces and of the militia is not at all affected
by the fifth or any other amendment. Ex parte MUlligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Also the right to trial by jury guaranteed by
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the sixth amendment was held not to apply to trials by courts-martial
or military commissions. Whelchel v. McDonald, 341 U.S. 122
(1950). Therefore the majority of the Court in the instant case
takes the view that any expansion of courts-martial jurisdiction over
former servicemen after separation from the services necessarily
encroaches on the jurisdiction of the federal courts set up under
the Constitution where persons are surrounded with more constitutional guarantees than in the military. Throughout the opinion it
is apparent that the Court is expressing an attitude indicating a
restraint on the military which has prevailed throughout the development of American law and government. In 1875 it was held that
the exercise of military power where the rights of citizens are concerned shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires.
Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 712 (1875). It is evident
that the majority felt art. 3(a) of the Uniform Code went beyond
this point.
The argument is presented that the present decision will have
an adverse effect upon the discipline of the armed forces since it is
now possible for crimes to go unpunished which are not discovered
while the perpetrator is within military jurisdiction. However, as
the majority points out, this argument appears insignificant when
weighed against any possibility of infringement of important constitutional guarantees.
The fact that there is an alternate solution left to Congress
which would adequately cover the situation is an additional factor
upholding the desirability of this decision. At present the federal
courts do -not have jurisdiction over crimes committed by citizens
abroad. However, the Supreme Court in the principal case expressed the view that there is no valid argument that ex-servicemen
must be tried by courts-martial or not at all since there is sufficient
authority to permit the extension of federal court jurisdiction to
cover this situation. Although the sixth amendment states that trial
shall be in the state and district where the crime was committed,
it has been held to apply only to federal offenses committed in a
state. Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157 (1891). The Constitution provides that if a crime is not committed within any state,
the trial shall be at such place or places as Congress may by law have
directed. U. S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. The Supreme Court has held that
a nation may impose obligations with respect to the conduct of its
citizens outside its territorial limits. United States v. Blackmer, 284
U.S. 421 (1932); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
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Although it is apparent that past and present offenders who
have escaped military jurisdiction will continue to go unpunished
due to the constitutional provision forbidding ex post facto legislation, there is no reason for the possibility of future crimes without
punishment if Congress takes prompt and appropriate action to
correct this present deficiency in the law.
T. E. P.
CORPORATIONS-ULTRA VmEs As AN AFFRmATVE PLEA.-P corporation was comprised of three stockholders, A, B, and C. A was
the president and owned 31 shares of stock. B was the secretary
and owned 28 shares of stock. C was the treasurer and owned 1
share of stock. A and B were husband and wife and C was A's
stepson and B's son. P insured A's life for $25,000.00 and named
P as the beneficiary of the policy. D was the insurer. Later, A and
B had marital difficulties and entered into a separation agreement
whereby assignment of $15,000.00 of the insurance policy was
made to B as protection in the event that other terms of the
separation agreement were not fulfilled. At the time of this assignment, P's assets were much less than its liabilities. A, B, and C
discussed the assignment and consented thereto. Still later, A and B
divorced and A remarried. After A's death, D paid $15,000.00 to B
although P notified D that P would seek all proceeds of the policy.
P now sues D. Held, that P's assignment was ultra vires, as P contended, and was thus void and of no effect and, also, that P was not
estopped to urge ultra vires. P recovered all proceeds of the policy.
CrQssland-Cullen Co. v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 133 F. Supp.
473 (W.D.D.C. 1955).
Involved here is a completely executed gratuitous partial
assignment of a chose in action. Being an ultra vires act, it affected
only parties to the transaction, creditors of the corporation, the
state of North Carolina, and stockholders of the corporation. All
shareholders ratified the act and neither the creditors, nor the
state, nor third parties to the act are involved in this suit.
"The theory that a corporation can do no acts beyond its authority, discarded by a majority of the courts in this country, is
responsible for most of the decisions that ultra vires contracts are
absolutely void. On the other hand, most of the courts hold that
ultra vires acts are the acts of the corporation and are not void,
and classify rights and liabilities according to whether the contract is (1) wholly executory, (2) wholly executed, or (3) executed
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